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Abstract—Local Differential Privacy (LDP) is popularly used in practice for privacy-preserving data collection. Although existing LDP
protocols offer high data utility for large user populations (100,000 or more users), they perform poorly in scenarios with small user
populations (such as those in the cybersecurity domain) and lack perturbation mechanisms that are effective for both ordinal and
non-ordinal item sequences while protecting sequence length and content simultaneously. In this paper, we address the small user
population problem by introducing the concept of Condensed Local Differential Privacy (CLDP) as a specialization of LDP, and develop
a suite of CLDP protocols that offer desirable statistical utility while preserving privacy. Our protocols support different types of client
data, ranging from ordinal data types in finite metric spaces (numeric malware infection statistics), to non-ordinal items (OS versions,
transaction categories), and to sequences of ordinal and non-ordinal items. Extensive experiments are conducted on multiple datasets,
including datasets that are an order of magnitude smaller than those used in existing approaches, which show that proposed CLDP
protocols yield higher utility compared to existing LDP protocols. Furthermore, case studies with Symantec datasets demonstrate that
our protocols outperform existing protocols in key cybersecurity-focused tasks of detecting ransomware outbreaks, identifying targeted
and vulnerable OSs, and inspecting suspicious activities on infected machines.
Index Terms—Privacy, local differential privacy, cybersecurity, malware epidemiology
F
1 INTRODUCTION
O Rganizations and companies are becoming increasingly in-terested in collecting user data and telemetry to make data-
driven decisions. While collecting and analyzing user data is
beneficial to improve services and products, users’ privacy poses
a major concern. Recently, the concept of Local Differential
Privacy (LDP) has emerged as the accepted standard for privacy-
preserving data collection [1], [2], [3]. In LDP, each user locally
perturbs their sensitive data on their device before sharing the
perturbed version with the data collector. The perturbation is
performed systematically such that the data collector cannot infer
with strong confidence the true value of any user given their
perturbed value, yet it can still make accurate inferences pertaining
to the general population. Due to its desirable properties, LDP
has been adopted by major companies to perform certain tasks,
including Google to analyze browser homepages and default
search engines in Chrome [2], [4], Apple for determining emoji
frequencies and spelling prediction in iOS [5], [6], and Microsoft
to collect application telemetry in Windows 10 [7].
While LDP is popularly used for the aforementioned purposes,
one domain that is yet to embrace it is cybersecurity. It can
be argued that this nuanced domain has the potential to greatly
benefit from an LDP-like protection mechanism. This is because
many security products rely on information collected from their
clients, with the required telemetry ranging from file occurrence
information in file reputation systems [8], [9], [10] to heteroge-
neous security event information such as system calls and memory
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dumps in the context of Endpoint Detection and Response systems
(see [11] for a survey on core behavioral detection techniques
used by such systems). Nevertheless, clients are often reluctant to
share such data fearing that it may reveal the applications they
are running, the files they store, or the overall cyber hygiene of
their devices. Providing an LDP-like protection would offer clients
formal privacy guarantees and help convince them that sharing
their data will not cause privacy leakages.
Recent interest in LDP led to the development of accurate
and optimized protocols, such as RAPPOR and OLH, that are
also used in the design of more sophisticated LDP algorithms [2],
[4], [12], [13], [14], [15]. However, existing LDP protocols suffer
from problems that hinder their deployment in the cybersecurity
domain. First, although they are accurate for large populations
(e.g., hundreds of thousands of clients), their accuracy suffers
when client populations are smaller. Population size is not nec-
essarily a problem for the likes of Google Chrome and Apple
iOS with millions of active users, but it does cause problems
in a domain such as cybersecurity where small population sizes
are common. For example, if a security analyst is analyzing the
behavior of a particular malware that targets a certain system or
vulnerability, only those clients who are infected by the malware
will have meaningful observations to report, but the number of
infections could be limited to less than a couple of thousand users
globally due to the targeted nature of the malware. In such cases,
we need a new scheme that allows the security analyst to make
accurate inferences while simultaneously giving adequate privacy
to end users. Second, existing protocols consider a limited set
of primitive data types. To the best of our knowledge, currently
no protocol supports perturbation of item sequences (with either
ordinal or non-ordinal item domains) to offer privacy with respect
to sequence length and content simultaneously. Sequences are
more difficult to handle compared to the data types of singleton
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items or itemsets since they are not only high-dimensional, but
also contain an ordering that must be preserved for tasks such as
pattern mining. Yet, sequential data is ubiquitous in cybersecurity,
e.g., security logs, network traffic data, file downloads, and so
forth are all examples of sequential data.
In this paper, we propose the notion of Condensed LDP
(CLDP) and a suite of protocols satisfying CLDP to tackle these
issues. In practice, CLDP is similar to LDP with the addition of a
condensation aspect, i.e., during the process of perturbation, simi-
lar outputs are systematically favored compared to distant outputs
using condensed probability. We design protocols satisfying CLDP
for various types of data, including singletons and sequences of
ordinal and non-ordinal items. We show that CLDP can be satisfied
by a variant of the Exponential Mechanism [16], and employ
this mechanism as a building block in our Ordinal-CLDP, Item-
CLDP, and Sequence-CLDP protocols. Our methods are generic
and can be easily applied for privacy-preserving data collection in
a variety of domains, including but not limited to cybersecurity.
Under the prevalent adversarial threat model of LDP, we show
that our CLDP protocols can give equivalent (or better) protection
than LDP protocols if CLDP’s privacy budget is set accordingly.
Under this setting, our protocols provide higher utility than LDP
protocols by yielding accurate insights for population sizes that
are an order of magnitude smaller than those currently assumed
by the state-of-the-art LDP approaches.
We also perform extensive experiments to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of our protocols on real-world case studies and public
datasets. Our experiments show that proposed CLDP protocols
outperform existing LDP protocols in key tasks such as frequency
estimation, heavy hitter identification, and pattern mining. Using
data from Symantec, a major cybersecurity vendor, we show that
CLDP can be used in practice for use cases involving ransomware
outbreak detection, OS vulnerability analysis, and inspecting sus-
picious activities on infected machines. In contrast, existing LDP
protocols can either not be applied to these problems or their
application yields unacceptable accuracy loss. To the best of our
knowledge, our work is the first to apply the concept of local
privacy to the nuanced domain of cybersecurity.
2 BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM SETTING
We consider the local privacy setting, where there are many
clients (users) and an untrusted data collector (server). Each client
possesses a secret value. The client’s secret value can be an ordinal
item (e.g., numeric value or integer), a categorical item, a non-
ordinal item, or a sequence of items. The server wants to collect
data from clients to derive useful insights; however, since the
clients do not trust the server, they perturb their secrets locally on
their device before sharing the perturbed version with the server.
Randomized perturbation ensures that the server, having observed
the perturbed data, cannot infer the true value of any one client
with strong probability. This resilience to reverse-engineering
gives clients privacy and plausible deniability. At the same time,
the scheme allows the server to derive useful insights from
aggregate perturbed data by analyzing aggregate population-level
statistics and information pertaining to the general population, thus
improving data-driven decisions and product quality.
2.1 Local Differential Privacy
The state-of-the-art scheme currently used and deployed by major
companies such as Google, Apple, and Microsoft in this local
privacy architecture is LDP [2], [4], [5], [6], [7]. In LDP, each
user perturbs their true value v using an algorithm Ψ and sends
Ψ(v) to the server. The formal privacy guarantee satisfied by Ψ is
given by the following definition.
Definition 1 (ε-LDP). A randomized algorithm Ψ satisfies ε-local
differential privacy (ε-LDP), where ε > 0, if and only if for any
inputs v1, v2 in universe U , we have:
∀y ∈ Range(Ψ) : Pr[Ψ(v1) = y]
Pr[Ψ(v2) = y]
≤ eε
where Range(Ψ) denotes the set of all possible outputs of
algorithm Ψ.
Here, ε is the privacy parameter controlling the level of
indistinguishability. Lower ε yields higher privacy. Several works
were devoted to building accurate protocols that satisfy ε-LDP.
These works were analyzed and compared in [3], and it was found
that the two currently optimal protocols are based on: (i) OLH,
the hashing extension of the GRR primitive and (ii) RAPPOR, the
Bloom filter-based bitvector encoding and bit flipping strategy.
Next, we briefly present these protocols.
Generalized Randomized Response (GRR). This protocol is
a generalization of the Randomized Response survey technique
introduced in [17]. Given the user’s true value v, the perturbation
function ΨGRR outputs y with probability:
Pr[ΨGRR(v) = y] =
{
p = e
ε
eε+|U|−1 if y = v
q = 1eε+|U|−1 if y 6= v
where |U| denotes the size of the universe. This satisfies ε-LDP
since pq = e
ε. In words, ΨGRR takes as input v and assigns a
higher probability p to returning the same output y = v. With
remaining 1− p probability, ΨGRR samples a fake item from the
universe U \ {v} uniformly at random, and outputs this fake item.
Optimized Local Hashing (OLH). When the universe size |U| is
large, it dominates the denominator of p and q, thus the accuracy
of GRR deteriorates quickly. The OLH protocol proposed in [3]
handles the large universe problem by first using a hash function
to map v into a smaller domain of hash values and then applying
GRR on the hashed value. Formally, the client reports:
ΨOLH(v) = 〈H,ΨGRR(H(v))〉
where H is a randomly chosen hash function from a family of
hash functions. Each hash function in the family maps v ∈ U to
a domain {1...g}, where g denotes the size of the hashed domain,
typically g << |U|. We use g = deε + 1e as the optimal value of
g found in [3].
Randomized Aggregatable Privacy-Preserving Ordinal Re-
sponse (RAPPOR). RAPPOR was developed by Google and
is used in Chrome [2]. In RAPPOR, the user’s true value v is
encoded in a bitvector B. The straightforward method is to use
one-hot encoding such that B is a length-|U| binary vector where
the v’th position is 1 and the remaining positions are 0. When |U|
is large, both communication cost and inaccuracy cause problems,
hence RAPPOR uses Bloom filter encoding. Specifically, B is
treated as a Bloom filter and a set of hash functions H is used to
map v into a set of integer positions that must be set to 1. That is,
∀H ∈ H, B[H(v)] = 1, and the remaining positions are 0.
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After the encoding, RAPPOR uses perturbation function
ΨRAPPOR on B to obtain perturbed bitvector B′ as follows:
Pr
[
B′[i] = ΨRAPPOR(B[i]) = 1
]
=
{
eε/2∆
eε/2∆+1
if B[i] = 1
1
eε/2∆+1
if B[i] = 0
where 2∆ is analogous to the notion of sensitivity in differential
privacy [18], i.e., how many positions can change in neighboring
bitvectors at most? In one-hot encoding, ∆ = 1; in Bloom filter
encoding, ∆ = |H|. Then, the perturbation process considers each
position inB independently, and the existing bitB[i] is either kept
or flipped when creating B′[i].
2.2 Utility Model and Analysis
The most common use of LDP is to enable the data collector learn
aggregate population statistics from large collections of perturbed
data. Much research has been invested in tasks such as frequency
estimation (identify proportion of users who have a certain item)
and heavy hitter discovery (identify popular items that are held by
largest number of users) [3], [13], [19], [20]. Utility is measured
by how closely the privately collected statistics resemble the actual
statistics that would have been obtained if privacy was not applied.
Frequency estimation and heavy hitter discovery are important
tasks in the cybersecurity domain as well. For example, by
monitoring the observed frequencies of different malware using
aggregates of privatized malware reports, a cybersecurity vendor
such as Symantec can identify large-scale malware outbreaks and
create response teams to address them. Furthermore, analyzing the
heavy hitter operating systems that are most commonly infected by
the malware will enable Symantec understand OS vulnerabilities
as well as the fraction of clients in its user base that are impacted.
Relevant findings may also be used by Symantec when developing
its next-generation anti-malware defenses.
A novel challenge posed by the cybersecurity domain, how-
ever, is accurately supporting small user populations. Typically,
existing LDP literature assumes the availability of “large enough”
user populations in the order of hundreds of thousands or millions
of users [2], [3], [5], [13]. Yet, population sizes in the cybersecu-
rity domain are typically much smaller. For example, consider a
security analyst analyzing the behavior of a specific malware by
studying infected user machines. It is often the case that malware
targets a specific computing platform or software product, limiting
the total number of infections to less than a couple of thousand
users globally. We designed the frequency estimation experiment
in Figure 1 to illustrate how the utility of existing LDP protocols
suffer under such small populations. We sampled each user’s
secret value from a Gaussian distribution with mean µ = 50 and
standard deviation σ = 12, and rounded it to the nearest integer.
The goal of the data collector is to estimate the true frequency of
each integer. We run this experiment for varying number of users
between 1,000 and 100,000 and graph the error in the frequency
estimations made by the data collector.
We observe from Figure 1 that although more recent and opti-
mized protocols improve previous ones by decreasing estimation
error (e.g., OLH outperforms RAPPOR, which outperforms GRR);
in cases with small user populations (e.g., 1000, 2500, or 5000
users) the improvements offered by more recent LDP protocols
over previous ones are only 10-20%, whereas our proposed CLDP
approach provides a remarkable 60-70% improvement. Further-
more, with 2500 users, estimation error is larger than 80% even
for the state-of-the-art OLH algorithm, which is optimized for
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Fig. 1: Measuring relative error in item frequency estimation by
calculating L1 distance between actual and estimated frequencies.
L1 distance of d means 100 · d % estimation error. Existing
LDP protocols (GRR, RAPPOR, and OLH) incur roughly 3-
fold accuracy loss in comparison to our CLDP approach when
population sizes are < 10,000.
frequency estimation [3]. In contrast, our proposed CLDP solution
is able to handle small user populations gracefully, with estimation
errors lower than half of OLH’s errors.
As shown by this analysis, the low utility levels of existing
LDP protocols under small user population sizes constitute an
important obstacle and drawback towards the deployment of LDP
in the cybersecurity domain. This motivates us to seek alternative
approaches and protocols for privacy-preserving data collection
under this challenging scenario.
2.3 Threat Model
The main goal of local privacy schemes is to offer confidentiality
and plausible deniability with respect to the user’s secret. Hence,
the threat stems from an untrusted third party (including the data
collector) inferring the true value of the user with high confidence,
from the perturbed value (s)he observes. Following this prevalent
threat model [2], [21], our goal is to stop an adversary A, even if
they can fully observe perturbed output y, from inferring the user’s
true secret v. Observe that, given y, the optimal attack strategy for
A is:
A(y) = arg max
vˆ∈U
Pr[vˆ|y] (1)
= arg max
vˆ∈U
pi(vˆ) · Pr[f(vˆ) = y]∑
z∈U pi(z) · Pr[f(z) = y]
(2)
where pi(vˆ) denotes the prior probability of vˆ, and f denotes
a locally private perturbation function (such as LDP). Then,
worst-case privacy can be measured using the maximum posterior
confidence (MPC) the adversary can achieve over all possible
inputs and outputs:
MPC = max
v,y∈U
Pr[v|y] = max
v,y∈U
pi(v) · Pr[f(v) = y]∑
z∈U pi(z) · Pr[f(z) = y]
(3)
This establishes a mathematical framework under which we can
quantify worst-case adversarial disclosure of LDP protocols and
CLDP protocols, for both informed adversaries (with prior knowl-
edge pi) and uninformed adversaries (e.g., by canceling out the pi
term, or equivalently, setting pi(x) = 1/|U| for all x ∈ U ).
2.4 Problem Statement
The problem we study in this paper can be stated as follows. Our
goal is to design a locally private data collection scheme such
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that: (i) it gives at least as strong privacy protection as existing
LDP protocols in the above threat model, (ii) while doing so, it
provides higher accuracy and data utility than existing protocols,
especially for small user populations, and finally (iii) it offers
extensibility and generalizability to support complex data types
such as different types of singleton items, itemsets, and sequences
that can be observed in the cybersecurity domain.
3 PROPOSED SOLUTION
In this section, we introduce our proposed solution aproach to
the problem stated above. We start with the notion of Condensed
Local Differential Privacy (CLDP).
3.1 Condensed Local Differential Privacy
Let U denote the finite universe of possible values (items) and let
d : U × U → [0,∞) be a distance function that takes as input
two items v1, v2 ∈ U and measures their distance. We require d
to satisfy the conditions for being a metric, i.e., non-negativity,
symmetry, triangle inequality, and identity of discernibles. Then,
CLDP can be formalized as follows.
Definition 2 (α-CLDP). A randomized algorithm Φ satisfies α-
condensed local differential privacy (α-CLDP), where α > 0, if
and only if for any inputs v1, v2 ∈ U :
∀y ∈ Range(Φ) : Pr[Φ(v1) = y]
Pr[Φ(v2) = y]
≤ eα·d(v1,v2)
where Range(Φ) denotes the set of all possible outputs of
algorithm Φ.
LDP and CLDP follow the same general structure and prin-
ciple, but differ in how their privacy parameters (ε, α) and
indistinguishability properties work. Similar to ε-LDP, α-CLDP
also satisfies the property that an adversary observing y will not
be able to distinguish whether the original value was v1 or v2. In
CLDP, indistinguishability is controlled also by items’ distance
d(·, ·) in addition to α. As such, it constitutes a metric-based
extension of LDP, such that if and only if d(v1, v2) = 1 for
all v1,v2, then CLDP is equivalent to LDP with α = ε; otherwise,
CLDP is a generalization of LDP with arbitrary d.
Note that metric-based extensions of differential privacy have
been studied in the past under certain settings such as aggregate
query answering in centralized statistical databases [22], geo-
indistinguishability in location-based systems [23], [24], and pro-
tecting sensitive relationships between entities in graphs through
k-edge differential privacy [25]. In contrast, we propose the
metric-based CLDP extension in the data collection setting. Our
data collection setting poses novel research challenges due to:
(i) the distributed (local) privacy scenario, unlike centralized DP
assumed in aggregate query answering and graph mining in which
user data is collected in the clear first and privacy is applied after
the data has been stored in a centralized database, (ii) data types
that are different than tabular datasets, locations, and graphs, and
(iii) establishing relationships and comparison between CLDP and
LDP under the assumed threat and utility models.
Since existing LDP protocols do not satisfy CLDP, we need
new mechanisms and protocols supporting CLDP. We show below
that a variant of the Exponential Mechanism (EM) [16] satisfies
α-CLDP. EM is used in the remainder of the paper as a building
block for more advanced CLDP protocols.
Exponential Mechanism (EM). Let v ∈ U be the user’s true
value, and let the Exponential Mechanism, denoted by ΦEM , take
as input v and output a perturbed value in U , i.e., ΦEM : U → U .
Then, ΦEM that produces output y with the following probability
satisfies α-CLDP:
∀y ∈ U : Pr[ΦEM (v) = y] = e
−α·d(v,y)
2∑
z∈U e
−α·d(v,z)
2
Theorem 1. Exponential Mechanism satisfies α-CLDP.
Proof. Provided in Appendix A.
3.2 Privacy Guarantees of LDP and CLDP
We study the resilience of LDP and CLDP against the prevalent
threat model from Section 2.3. We are interested in keeping the
MPC of α-CLDP equal to or lower than the MPC of ε-LDP, so
that we can ensure CLDP gives equal or better protection than
LDP under this threat model. Another benefit of this analysis is to
establish a link between the privacy budgets ε and α.
Question: Let U , d and pi be given. If there is an LDP protocol
currently in place with privacy budget ε and we are interested in
switching to α-CLDP, how should the value of α be selected to
achieve equal or better protection than LDP according to the MPC
threat model?
Answer: Based on the quantification of the adversary’s maximum
(worst-case) posterior confidence from Equation 3, the require-
ment to have the MPC of CLDP less than or equal to that of LDP
can be written as:
max
v,y
pi(v) · Pr[Φ(v) = y]∑
z∈U pi(z) · Pr[Φ(z) = y]
≤ max
v,y
pi(v) · Pr[Ψ(v) = y]∑
z∈U pi(z) · Pr[Ψ(z) = y]
(4)
where Ψ denotes LDP perturbation and Φ denotes CLDP
perturbation. Using U , d, pi and ε, we can compute the right
hand side, and then search for the largest α such that the left
hand side remains smaller than the right hand side, iteratively by
incrementing α in each iteration and re-computing the left hand
side in each iteration.
Practical Analysis: To demonstrate the practicality of the rela-
tionship we establish above and derive insights, we solve Equation
4 under three example pi settings. In all settings, we assume U is
the set of integers between [0, 99] and d measures absolute value
distance between two integers. We use pi = Uniform, Gaussian and
Exponential distributions with the corresponding distribution pa-
rameters given in Figure 2. Our rationale is that each pi represents
a different type of skewness: Uniform has no skewness, Gaussian
is symmetrically skewed around the mean, and Exponential has
positive skew. Users’ secrets are samples from these distributions
rounded to the nearest integer. Distribution parameters are chosen
so that users’ secrets fall within the universe of [0, 99] with non-
negligible tail probabilities. In Figure 2, we provide the results
of our study for a wide range of ε values used in the literature:
0.25 ≤ ε ≤ 4. Note that this figure is obtained purely by solving
Equation 4, and does not require a real simulation or execution of
the protocol involving end clients, i.e., the solution can be used in
setup time before any data collection occurs.
Figure 2 allows us to derive several interesting insights. The
first important conclusion is that ε and α are positively correlated
– as the privacy requirement of LDP is relaxed, we can also relax
that of CLDP. Second, it is often the case that α  ε. When
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Fig. 2: Exemplifying the relationship between ε in ε-LDP and α
in α-CLDP according to Equation 4, with |U| = 100 and pi =
Uniform, Exponential, Gaussian.
making it so that LDP and CLDP give equivalent protection,
in order to compensate for the added term of d(·, ·) decreasing
indistinguishability of distant items under CLDP, we have to use
much smaller α in CLDP compared to ε of LDP. Third, we observe
that the relationship between ε and α depends on pi, e.g., if the
data follows a Uniform distribution, CLDP must use a stricter
α than the other two distributions. The reason is because there
are two determining factors in calculating adversarial confidence:
pi and Pr[f(v) = y]. For skewed distributions, pi becomes the
dominating factor and since the same pi is shared by LDP and
CLDP, the behavior of perturbation functions have relatively less
impact on adversarial confidence. In contrast, for the Uniform
distribution, since Pr[f(v) = y] becomes the dominating factor
and its value is high for the tail-ends of the domain in the case
of CLDP, we must use lower (stricter) α in CLDP to match the
adversarial confidence in LDP.
In summary, for the adversarial threat model under consid-
eration, given the parameters of ε, U , d and pi under LDP,
if we choose α according to the guideline of Equation 4, the
maximum adversarial confidence under our CLDP protocols will
be equal to or lower than that under LDP protocols. The analysis
exemplified above can be applied in protocol setup time (before
data collection) to convert ε to α.
4 CLDP MECHANISMS AND PROTOCOLS
In this section, we present protocols that can be used in practice
to collect data while achieving CLDP. We present three protocols:
Ordinal-CLDP, Item-CLDP, and Sequence-CLDP, to address dif-
ferent types of client data.
4.1 Ordinal-CLDP for Ordinal Items
Our first protocol is Ordinal-CLDP, which addresses data types
that stem from finite metric spaces, i.e., U is discrete and finite,
and there exists a built-in distance metric d : U × U → [0,∞).
This setting covers a variety of useful data types: (i) discrete
numeric or integer domains where d can be the absolute value
distance between two items, (ii) ordinal item domains with total
order, e.g., letters and strings ordered by dictionary order A< B<
C < ..., and (iii) categorical domains with tree-structured domain
taxonomy where distance between two items can be measured
using the depth of their most recent common ancestor in the
taxonomy tree [26], [27]. In these scenarios, item order and d
are naturally defined and enforced.
Algorithm 1: Ordinal-CLDP using EM
Input : α: CLDP privacy parameter, U : item universe,
d: distance metric, v: user’s true value
Output: v′ ∈ U : perturbed value
1 for each y ∈ U do
2 Assign score(y) = e
−α·d(v,y)
2
3 end
4 Pick a random sample v′ from U , where
Pr[v′ is sampled] = score(v
′)∑
z∈U score(z)
5 return v′
In Ordinal-CLDP, each client locally applies the Exponential
Mechanism (EM) implementation shown in Algorithm 1, and
uploads the perturbed output to the server. Notice that α, U , d, and
user’s true value v are all inputs to the algorithm. The algorithm’s
output v′ is sent to the collector, thereby concluding the protocol
in a single round without blocking.
4.2 Item-CLDP for Non-Ordinal Items
Our second protocol is Item-CLDP in which each user still holds
a singleton true item, but the items come from an arbitrary U
with no pre-defined d or total order. For example, if U consists
of OS names, an order of MacOS < Ubuntu < Windows is
neither available nor initially justifiable. This non-ordinal item
setting has been assumed in recent LDP research for finding
popular emojis, emerging slang terms, popular and anomalous
browser homepages, and merchant transactions [2], [3], [5], [6],
[20]. We propose Item-CLDP in a generic way to maximize its
scope and cover such existing cases. Parallel to previous works,
our goal is to uphold relative item frequencies to learn popularity
histograms and discover heavy hitters. To this end, we propose
that a desirable perturbation strategy should replace a popular item
with another popular item, and an uncommon item with another
uncommon item. This achieves our goal of upholding relative
item frequencies, as the expected behavior (conceptually) will be
that popular items and uncommon items will be shuffled among
themselves, and relative frequencies will be preserved.
The proposed Item-CLDP protocol is given in Figure 3. In
Item-CLDP the server communicates with each client twice, hence
the protocol consists of two rounds. The first round contains steps
1-3 and the second round contains steps 3-5. The server executes
the first round with each client in parallel (without blocking). At
the end of the first round, the server performs the aggregation
and de-noising step (Step 3). Then, the server executes the second
round of communication. Next, we explain each step in detail.
Step 1. When the protocol starts, the server knows universe U and
each client has a true value v. The value of the privacy budget
α and budget allocation parameter 0 < L < 1 can be publicly
known. (The role of L will be explained later.) A random total
order is constructed among all items in U such that for {xi} ∈ U ,
d(xi, xi+1) = 1. The server advertises U and d to all clients.
Step 2. Each client runs Algorithm 1 with budget α · L to obtain
a perturbed value v′ locally on their device. Then, the clients send
their v′ to the server.
Step 3. Due to the utility-unaware choice of d in Step 1, the
absolute item frequencies discovered at this step contain signifi-
cant error. A second round is desirable to reduce error. We found
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Send d, 𝒰
Send v'
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Send v''
Run v' = Alg. 1 (αL, 𝒰 , d, v) 2
Assume a random total order 
in 𝒰 such that {xi}∊ 𝒰: x1 ≤ 
x2 ≤ … ≤ xn and d(xi, xi+1) = 1
1
Aggregate results from all clients, 
apply denoising to infer refined d'
3
Run v'' = Alg. 1 (α(1-L), 𝒰 , d', v) 4
Aggregate results from all clients, 
obtain final frequency estimations
5
Fig. 3: Item-CLDP protocol to report non-ordinal items.
that although the server does not accurately learn absolute item
frequencies by the end of Step 2, it can learn frequency ranking
of items after applying a de-noising strategy. A key aspect is how
de-noising is performed. Let y ∈ U be an item, let true(y) be the
true count of y in the population, which we are trying to find, and
let obs(y) denote the observed count of y following the first round
of client-server communication (i.e., by the beginning of Step 3).
The following holds in expectation:
obs(y) = true(y) · Pr[ΦEM (y) = y]
+
∑
x∈U\{y}
true(x) · Pr[ΦEM (x) = y]
Our goal is to solve for true(y), but we cannot do so since
true(x) is also unknown. Hence, in our de-noising strategy we
make the heuristic decision of plugging obs(x) in place of true(x),
thereby obtaining true′(y) as follows:
true′(y) =
obs(y)−∑x∈U\{y} obs(x) · Pr[ΦEM (x) = y]
Pr[ΦEM (y) = y]
We apply this to all y’s in U and rank them according to their
true′(y). The distance function d′ is set to reflect this new ranking
instead of the original d from Step 1.
Step 4. After the clients receive d′, each client runs Algorithm 1
with d′ to obtain v′′ and sends v′′ to the server. This invocation of
the algorithm is with budget (1− L) · α.
Step 5. Upon receiving the v′′ values from all clients, the server
aggregates all results and obtains the final frequency estimates.
Role of parameter L. Since Item-CLDP is a two-round protocol,
each client sends perturbed information twice. Hence, we need to
quantify the total privacy disclosure by the end of two rounds.
We introduce the parameter L to control the amount of disclosure.
L takes values between 0 and 1, and determines how the CLDP
privacy budget will be allocated to the two rounds of Item-CLDP.
Denoting Item-CLDP by ΦITEM , it is easy to show that for any
two possible inputs v1,v2 of a user:
Pr[ΦITEM (v1) = 〈v′, v′′〉]
Pr[ΦITEM (v2) = 〈v′, v′′〉] ≤ e
α·L·d(v1,v2) · eα·(1−L)·d′(v1,v2)
≤ eα·max{d(v1,v2),d′(v1,v2)}
The property follows from the fact that the first round satisfies
(α · L)-CLDP with d, and the second round satisfies α · (1 −
L)-CLDP with d′. We choose the value of L by finding which
L yields minimum frequency estimation error by the end of the
second round of Item-CLDP. According to our experiments with
different L, we recommend L ∼= 0.8 as it often gives best results,
which indicates that finding an accurate preliminary ranking in
the first round of Item-CLDP is indeed important to obtain a good
final result.
4.3 Sequence-CLDP for Item Sequences
In Ordinal-CLDP and Item-CLDP, each user reports a single item.
We now study the case where each user reports a collection
of items. We give our Sequence-CLDP protocol assuming this
collection forms a sequence and later show the applicability
of Sequence-CLDP to set-valued data. Sequential data arises
naturally in many domains, including cybersecurity (log files),
genomics (DNA sequences), web browsing histories, and mobility
traces; thus, a protocol for privacy-preserving collection of item
sequences holds great practical value. We denote by X a user’s
true sequence, and by X[i] the i’th element in X . Each element
X[i] is an item from universe U . We assume the distance metric
d between individual items is known apriori, e.g., for ordinal U
we can use built-in d as in Ordinal-CLDP; otherwise, we can infer
d using a process similar to the first round of Item-CLDP. We
measure distance between two sequences dseq(X,Y ) as:
dseq(X,Y ) =
|X|∑
i=1
d(X[i], Y [i])
In Sequence-CLDP, each client runs the sequence random-
ization procedure given in Algorithm 2 to locally perturb their X .
The procedure has two probability parameters: 0 < halt, gen < 1,
and a length parameter max len denoting the maximum sequence
length allowed. Given true sequence X , the algorithm returns a
perturbed sequence S. Our goal in Sequence-CLDP is to hide
two complementary types of information: the length of X and
the contents of X . For example, let X consist of a sequence
of security events observed on a machine. Hiding the length
of X is useful because it disables the adversary from learning
that many security events were observed on this machine, hence
that the machine is probably infected. Hiding the contents of X
is useful because it disables the adversary from learning which
security events were observed, hence the adversary cannot infer
which types of problems exist on the machine, which attacks are
successful, and so forth. Denoting Sequence-CLDP by ΦSEQ, we
formalize these privacy properties as follows.
Definition 3. Let Pr[ΦSEQ(X)  `] denote the probabil-
ity that ΦSEQ(X) produces a perturbed sequence of length `
given input sequence X . We say that ΦSEQ satisfies α-length-
indistinguishability if for any pair of true sequences X , Y :
Pr[ΦSEQ(X) `]
Pr[ΦSEQ(Y ) `]
≤ eα·abs(|X|−|Y |)
Definition 4. Let Pr[ΦSEQ(X) = S] denote the probability that
ΦSEQ(X) produces perturbed sequence S given input sequence
X . We say that ΦSEQ satisfies α-content-indistinguishability if,
for any pair of true sequences X , Y of same length, it holds that:
Pr[ΦSEQ(X) = S]
Pr[ΦSEQ(Y ) = S]
≤ eα·dseq(X,Y )
Definition 3 states that an adversary observing the length of
the output sequence should not infer the length of the user’s
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Algorithm 2: Sequence-CLDP randomization
Parameter: Probabilities halt, gen, maximum length
allowed max len
Input : Client’s private sequence X , privacy budget α,
item universe U , distance metric d
Output : Randomized sequence S
1 while X is shorter than max len do
2 Pad X with stop sign ⊥ // Dummy symbol
3 end
4 Initialize empty sequence S
5 for i = 1 to max len do
6 if X[i] 6= ⊥ then
7 With probability halt, stop here and return S
8 With probability (1− halt), run Alg. 1 with inputs
(α, U , d, X[i]) to obtain v′, and append v′ to S
9 end
10 else
11 With probability gen, randomly pick an item from
U and append it to S
12 With probability (1− gen), stop here and return S
13 end
14 end
15 return S
true sequence with high confidence. Definition 4 states that an
adversary observing the contents of the output sequence should
not infer the contents of the user’s true sequence with high
confidence. If ΦSEQ simultaneously satisfies both definitions,
we can conclude that it successfully hides both the length and
the contents of a user’s true sequence. Note that both guarantees
are adaptations of the CLDP notion, hence the degree of privacy
protection is controlled by the CLDP privacy parameter α.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 2 satisfies α-length-indistinguishability
and α-content-indistinguishability simultaneously if halt, gen are
selected either symmetrically as:
halt = gen =
1
eα + 1
or asymmetrically within the ranges:
0 < halt <
1
eα + 1
and 1− eα · halt ≤ gen ≤ 1− halt
eα
Proof. Provided in Appendix A.
It can be observed from Algorithm 2 that high halt causes
the algorithm to terminate early for a long sequence, causing the
perturbed sequence S to be much shorter than X . High gen adds
random items to S, thus it causes S to be much longer than
X; in addition, since the added items are sampled uniformly
at random, S will contain bogus elements. If we consider only
the utility perspective, simultaneously decreasing the values of
halt and gen yields higher sequence utility. However, Theorem 2
places bounds on the values of halt and gen; we cannot arbitrarily
decrease them, otherwise we will not satisfy the indistinguishabil-
ity properties. Among the given choices, asymmetric parameter
choice is preferable when we expect users’ true sequences to
be long, since it assigns a lower halting probability compared
to the symmetric case, thereby decreasing the probability that
the algorithm is terminated early. This is done at the cost of
increased gen, which implies that the asymmetric case will more
likely add synthetic elements to S. Since this is detrimental to
utility especially when users’ true sequences are short, for short
sequences, we recommend using the symmetric parameter choice.
Application to set-valued data. Although Sequence-CLDP is
designed for sequences, it can be applied to set-valued data
without information loss as follows. First, each user enforces a
random ordering among the items in their itemset, to convert the
itemset to a sequence. Second, the user runs Sequence-CLDP on
this converted sequence to obtain a perturbed sequence. Third, the
user removes the ordering from the perturbed sequence to obtain
a perturbed itemset. Finally, the perturbed itemset is sent to the
server. On the other hand, we cannot use existing set-valued LDP
protocols [13], [15] on sequences without losing their sequentiality
(ordering) aspect. Hence, we believe Sequence-CLDP has wider
applicability than existing set-valued protocols.
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We compare our proposed CLDP protocols against the existing
LDP protocols on real-world cybersecurity datasets provided by
Symantec as well as on public datasets. In singleton item compar-
ison, we use RAPPOR (proposed and deployed by Google [2]) and
OLH (recent protocol with improved utility over prior works [3]).
In set-valued setting, we use SVIM as the current state-of-the-
art LDP protocol [15]. In each experimental dataset and setting,
given U , d and ε, we freshly execute Equation 4 and the process
in Section 3.2 to obtain the appropriate α parameter for CLDP to
ensure a fair comparison under each individual setting.
Experiment Summary and Highlights. In Section 5.1, we con-
sider cybersecurity use cases that reflect the limitations of existing
LDP protocols, e.g., user populations are small and sequential
datasets cannot be handled. In these experiments, our results show
that LDP protocols do not yield sufficient utility while satisfying
a desirable level of privacy (e.g., for ε = 1). In contrast, our CLDP
protocols offer satisfactory utility in most cases, hence their use in
corresponding security products is practical and more preferable.
In Section 5.2, we experiment on public datasets which differ
from the above since they do not reflect the limitations of LDP
protocols, e.g., user populations are sufficiently large (over half
a million). Even so, we show that our CLDP protocols perform
at least comparable to, or in many cases better than, the existing
LDP protocols. A particularly interesting result is that while LDP
protocols are capable of finding the frequencies and ranking of
heaviest hitter items with good accuracy (e.g., top 5-10% of
the universe), CLDP protocols’ accuracy is similar for these few
heavy hitters, but they significantly outperform LDP protocols for
remaining items (medium frequency and infrequent items).
5.1 Case Studies with Cybersecurity Datasets
Cybersecurity datasets provided by Symantec allowed us to test
the accuracy of our protocols on pertinent real-world use cases
and assess their practical applicability. We note that certain details
such as the total number of infected machines are omitted on
purpose due to confidentiality reasons.
Case Study #1: Ransomware Outbreak Detection
Setup. We consider the case where Symantec collects mal-
ware reports from machines running its anti-malware protection
software. Each machine sends a locally private malware report to
Symantec daily, containing the count of malware-related events
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Fig. 4: Monitoring the infections of ransomware Cerber for one month to detect a potential outbreak. Illustrated in the graphs is the
actual number of infections versus infections reported by LDP protocols RAPPOR and OLH, and our Ordinal-CLDP protocol (ε = 1).
Ordinal-CLDP outperforms existing LDP protocols in reporting daily infection counts and can be used to detect potential outbreaks
without major false positives or negatives.
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Fig. 5: Monitoring the infections of ransomware Locky for one month to detect a potential outbreak. Refer to Figure 4 for a similar
experiment with a different ransomware (ε = 1.0). Same conclusions apply to this figure.
observed on that machine during that day. Privacy is injected into
malware reports by modifying the actual counts with LDP/CLDP.
For our experiments, we obtained the daily infection counts
of two ransomware variants within those time periods in which
we already know there were global outbreaks. Specifically, we
considered the infections reported for Cerber between March 22
and April 21 in 2017 with the outbreak happening on April 6, and
those reported for Locky between February 11 and March 13 in
2018 with the outbreak happening on February 26. We evaluated
how accurately the total number of daily infections for these two
ransomware variants can be estimated using our Ordinal-CLDP
approach versus LDP approaches RAPPOR and OLH. The goal of
our experiment is to retroactively test whether LDP/CLDP could
identify if and when a ransomware outbreak happened.
Results. We illustrate the results in Figures 4 and 5 for
Cerber and Locky respectively. If we use RAPPOR or OLH to
perform detection, we obtain many false positives (days on which
RAPPOR/OLH claim there was an outbreak, but in fact there was
not) and false negatives (days on which RAPPOR/OLH claim
there was no outbreak, but in fact there was). Some important
examples are marked on the graphs, e.g., in Figure 4, RAPPOR
raises false positives on March 23-24 as well as April 12-13. In
addition, OLH misses the onset of the outbreak happening on April
5 by reporting 0 observed infections whereas in reality there are
16,388 infections.
False positives are costly to Symantec since they cause the
company to devote resources and response teams to combat a
malware outbreak that does not exist. False negatives are also
costly since Symantec will not react to the malware outbreak
in a timely manner, losing customer trust. Observing this many
false positives and false negatives with LDP methods raises
serious concerns. In contrast, using our Ordinal-CLDP protocol,
Symantec can obtain daily infection counts with high accuracy.
Note that in Figures 4 and 5, there are small discrepancies between
the actual infections versus CLDP’s predicted infections, which
demonstrates that CLDP is not error-free. However, contrary
to LDP protocols, our CLDP protocols can be used to detect
ransomware outbreaks in a privacy-preserving manner without
major false positives or negatives.
Case Study #2: Ransomware Vulnerability Analysis
Setup. Next, we ask the question: Can we find which oper-
ating systems were most infected by ransomware? This would
assist Symantec in discovering vulnerable or targeted OSs. When
performing this analysis, we focus specifically on the day of
outbreak (April 6, 2017 for Cerber and February 26, 2018 for
Locky) and the machines reporting infections on this day. We
assume Symantec obtains a locally private malware report from
these machines including the vendor, specs, and OS version.
Upon collecting reports from all machines, Symantec infers how
frequently each OS was infected in the population, and ranks OSs
in terms of infection frequency.
We conduct two experiments. In the first experiment, we
find the actual (non-private) infection frequency of each OS, and
compare actual frequencies with the frequencies that would be
obtained if RAPPOR, OLH, or Item-CLDP were applied, using L1
distance as measurement of error. We vary ε between 0.5≤ ε ≤ 4.
In the second experiment, we fix ε = 1, rank the OSs in terms of
infection frequency (highest to lowest), and study the top-10 most
infected OSs. Due to ethical considerations, we anonymize OS
names by renaming according to their actual rank, e.g., top-ranked
OS is named os1, 2nd ranked OS is named os2, and so forth. If a
lower-ranked OS is a different version of a higher ranked OS, we
add the version information to the name, e.g., os1 v2.
Results. We report the results of these experiments on Cerber
and Locky in Figures 6 and 7, respectively. In the tables on the
right, those OSs that are correctly discovered by RAPPOR, OLH,
and Item-CLDP with correct ranks are depicted in bold. OSs that
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Fig. 7: Analyzing OS vulnerability for ransomware Locky. Refer
to Figure 6 for a similar experiment with a different ransomware,
same details and conclusions apply to this figure.
are correctly discovered but have incorrect rank are depicted in
regular font. OSs that privacy methods claim to be among top-
10 but in reality are not are depicted with strike-through. We
first observe from the tables that the heaviest hitters are correctly
discovered in the correct order by all privacy solutions, e.g., top-3
in Cerber. However, as we move lower in the ranking, LDP/CLDP
methods start making errors. Particularly for Cerber, RAPPOR
and OLH correctly identify only 4 and 5 out of 10 most frequent
OSs, respectively, whereas Item-CLDP can identify 9 out of 10.
Note that Item-CLDP is missing only the lowest ranked OS (10th),
which is arguably the least significant among all ten.
L1 errors in the graphs on the left show that when ε is small
(0.5 or 1), LDP is competitive against CLDP in this case study.
When ε is higher, CLDP clearly dominates in terms of accuracy.
Comparing tabular rankings with L1 scores, we see that CLDP can
preserve relative rankings even when its L1 errors are similar to
those of LDP. For example, the L1 errors of RAPPOR, OLH, and
Item-CLDP are similar when ε = 1. However, studying the top-10
tables shows that Item-CLDP is better at identifying frequent OSs
than RAPPOR and OLH.
Case Study #3: Inspecting Suspicious Activity
Setup. In this case study, we consider the sequences of
security-related event flags raised by Symantec’s behavioral de-
tection engine on each client machine. There are 143 different
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Fig. 8: Utility preservation of Sequence-CLDP in mining top-
k n-gram patterns from security event sequences obtained from
ransomware infected machines. Sequence-CLDP allows discovery
of a high fraction of frequent patterns, which are useful to analyze
suspicious activity on the machines.
flags signalling various forms of suspicious activity, ranging from
process injection to load point modification. When a flag is raised,
it is logged on the client machine with a timestamp, as such
the collection of the flagged events constitute a sequence over
a time period. We investigate the accuracy of collecting these
event sequences using Sequence-CLDP. We focus on the same
31-day periods we considered in Case Study #1, and collect
locally private event sequences from the same set of machines
infected by ransomware Cerber/Locky. Longitudinal analysis of
these event sequences enables Symantec to inspect suspicious ac-
tivities possibly related to the ransomware infection, e.g., chain of
anomalous events leading to the infection. This helps in inferring
the precursors or consequences of the infection, and Symnatec can
update its detection engine based on the findings. In total, we have
23,558 and 5,717 sequences for Cerber and Locky, respectively,
with lengths between 2 to 30.
We use n-gram analysis by mining the top-k popular bigram
and trigram patterns from the sequences [9], [28]. We mine the
actual patterns that would be obtained if no privacy were applied,
and the patterns obtained after Sequence-CLDP is applied. Let
A denote the set of actual top-k patterns and B denote the set
of top-k patterns mined from perturbed data. We measure their
similarity using the Jaccard index: Jaccard(A,B) = |A∩B||A∪B| .
Jaccard similarity is between 0 and 1, with values close to 1
indicating higher similarity. We do not compare against RAPPOR,
OLH or SVIM in this case study, since they are not compatible
with sequence perturbation.
Results. The results are shown in Figure 8. We make two
important observations. First, as we relax the privacy requirement
by increasing α, n-grams mined from perturbed sequences become
more accurate, as implied by the increase in Jaccard similarity.
Second, mining fewer top-k patterns is easier than mining many
patterns in general. For example, top-20 in Locky has higher
Jaccard similarity score than top-30 and top-50. Similar observa-
tion applies to Cerber. This shows Sequence-CLDP preserves the
heaviest hitters best, and has higher probability of making errors
as n-grams become less and less frequent, which agree with our
intuition from Case Study #2. Note that we mine more patterns in
the case of Cerber (up to top-200 as opposed to top-50 for Locky)
since the Cerber dataset has more input sequences, thus we can
find more n-grams with significant support and confidence.
5.2 Experiments with Public Datasets
Datasets. We also experimented on two public datasets: POS and
Retail. Both are set-valued datasets. We use them to run singleton
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Fig. 9: AvRE (lower is better) and Kendall-tau scores (higher is better) for singleton experiments across all items in datasets Retail and
POS. Item-CLDP provides higher utility than LDP protocols in estimating item frequencies and rankings across a spectrum of ε values.
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Fig. 10: AvRE and Kendall-tau scores for top-k singletons in Retail and POS. ε fixed to 2.5, varying k on x-axis. Item-CLDP’s accuracy
is higher than LDP protocols especially for medium-frequency and infrequent items, e.g., k ≥ 256.
non-ordinal item experiments as well as set-valued experiments.
For the former, we randomly sample an item from each itemset to
create a singleton item dataset. For the latter, we run the set-valued
adaptation of our Sequence-CLDP protocol and compare it against
SVIM, the state-of-the-art set-valued LDP protocol [15].
POS contains several years of market basket sale data from
a large electronics retailer [29]. It consists of a total of 515,596
transactions with 1,657 unique items sold.
Retail contains transactions occurring between January 2010
and September 2011 for a UK-based online retail site [30]. After
cleaning empty entries, this dataset consists of a total of 540,455
transactions with 2,603 unique items.
Evaluation Metrics. We use the following metrics to evaluate
the accuracy of the privacy protocols. Similar to our notation from
Section 4.2, let x denote an item, true(x) denote its true frequency,
and est(x) denote its frequency estimated by the privacy protocol.
LetXgt = {x1, x2, ..., xk} be the ground truth top-k items where
xj is the j’th most frequent item.
Average Relative Error (AvRE) measures the mean relative
error in top-k items’ estimated frequencies versus their true fre-
quencies. Formally:
AvRE =
∑
x∈Xgt
abs(est(x)−true(x))
true(x)
k
The Kendall-tau coefficient (KT) measures how well the rank-
ings of heavy hitter top-k items are preserved. A pair of items x,
y ∈ Xgt are said to be concordant if their sorted popularity ranks
agree, i.e., either of the following hold:
true(x) > true(y) ∧ est(x) > est(y)
true(x) < true(y) ∧ est(x) < est(y)
They are said to be discordant if neither holds. Then, the Kendall-
tau coefficient of correlation can be defined as:
KT =
(# of concordant pairs)− (# of discordant pairs)
k(k − 1)/2
Results of Singleton Experiments. We run experiments in the
singleton setting and compare Item-CLDP with LDP protocols
RAPPOR and OLH. Each experiment is repeated 20 times and
results are averaged. In Figure 9, we measure AvRE and Kendall-
tau across all items by setting k = |U|. Results show that
as privacy is relaxed (i.e., ε and α increase) AvRE decreases
and Kendall-tau increases. In most cases, Item-CLDP provides
better accuracy than LDP protocols. Most noticeably, Kendall-
tau scores of Item-CLDP are much higher than those of LDP
protocols. When ε ≥ 3.5, Kendall-tau scores indicate almost
perfect correlation between actual item rankings and rankings
found by Item-CLDP, confirming its accuracy benefit.
Next, we fix the privacy parameter to ε = 2.5 and vary the
k (for top-k) to analyze how the protocols behave with respect
to varying popularities of items. The results of this experiment
are reported in Figure 10. For small k such as k ≤ 64, there is
usually one LDP protocol at least comparable to or better than
Item-CLDP. Note that k = 64 is a constrained setting covering
less than only 6% of the items in the universe. LDP protocols are
optimized to discover such heavy hitters and therefore, they deliver
good results when k is small. However, for larger k, we observe
that Item-CLDP can significantly outperform LDP. In particular,
for k ≥ 512, under LDP protocols there is almost no correlation in
frequency rankings (implied by Kendall-tau results near or below
0), whereas in Item-CLDP, a strong correlation is maintained
across all k. In short, if the goal is to discover only the top few
heavy hitters, LDP protocols offer sufficient accuracy. However,
if the goal is to find statistics regarding medium-frequency or
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Fig. 11: AvRE (bars, left y-axis) and Kendall-tau scores
(lines, right y-axis) for set-valued experiments across all items.
Sequence-CLDP preserves item frequencies and rankings more
effectively than SVIM.
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Fig. 12: AvRE (bars, left y-axis) and Kendall-tau scores (lines,
right y-axis) for set-valued experiments over top-k items with
ε = 2.5. Sequence-CLDP offers higher accuracy in terms of AvRE
and Kendall-tau for majority of k values.
infrequent items as well, LDP protocols have inadequate accuracy
and we recommend using Item-CLDP.
Results of Set-Valued Experiments. We compare the set-valued
adaptation of Sequence-CLDP against the SVIM protocol satis-
fying LDP [15]. Similar to the singleton experiment, we start by
setting k = |U| and vary ε to study the impact of the privacy
budget on accuracy across all items. From the results in Figure
11, we observe that Sequence-CLDP offers significant accuracy
improvement in terms of both AvRE and Kendall-tau score. For
example, the accuracy improvement in terms of AvRE ranges
between 30-90% depending on the dataset and the value of the
privacy parameter. In Figure 12, we fix ε to 2.5 and vary k. As
we increase k, the accuracy of the protocols generally decrease,
since making estimations regarding infrequent items is often more
difficult than estimating only the heavy hitters. For Sequence-
CLDP, this accuracy decrease is linear or sub-linear; but for
SVIM, when k > 512, errors start increasing almost exponentially,
reiterating that LDP protocols can be poorly suited to estimate
statistics regarding infrequent items. Studying the Kendall-tau
scores, for very small k, Kendall-tau of SVIM and Sequence-
CLDP are similar, whereas when k > 128, Sequence-CLDP’s
Kendall-tau scores are significantly better.
6 RELATED WORK
Differential privacy was initially proposed in the centralized set-
ting in which a trusted central data collector possesses a database
containing clients’ true values, and noise is applied on the database
or queries executed on the database instead of each client’s
individual value [18], [31]. In contrast, in LDP, each client locally
perturbs their data on their device before sending the perturbed
version to the data collector [1]. The local setting has seen
practical real-world deployment, including Google’s RAPPOR as
a Chrome extension [2], [4], Apple’s use of LDP for spelling
prediction and emoji frequency detection [5], [6], and Microsoft’s
collection of application telemetry [7].
Local differential privacy has also sparked interest from the
academic community. There have been several theoretical treat-
ments for finding upper and lower bounds on the accuracy and
utility of LDP [1], [19], [32], [33], [34]. From a more practical
perspective, Wang et al. [3] showed the optimality of OLH for
singleton item frequency estimation. Qin et al. [13] and Wang et
al. [15] studied frequent item and itemset mining from set-valued
client data. Cormode et al. [35] and Zhang et al. [36] studied the
problem of obtaining marginal tables from high-dimensional data.
Recently, LDP was considered in the contexts of geolocations [21],
decentralized social graphs [14], and discovering emerging terms
from text [12].
However, there have also been criticisms and concerns regard-
ing the utility of LDP, which motivated recent works proposing
relaxations or alternatives to LDP. BLENDER [37] proposed a
hybrid privacy model in which only a subset of users enjoy LDP,
whereas remaining users act as opt-in beta testers who receive
the guarantees of centralized DP. In contrast, our work stays
purely in the local privacy model without requiring a trusted data
collector (necessary in centralized or hybrid DP) or opt-in clients.
Personalized LDP, a weaker form of LDP, was proposed for spatial
data aggregation in [21]; whereas the Restricted LDP scheme
proposed in [38] treats certain client data as more sensitive than
others and suggests restricted perturbation schemes to specifically
address the more sensitive data. In contrast, our CLDP approach
treats all users’ data as sensitive (parallel with LDP assumptions),
remains agnostic and extensible with respect to data types, and
gives as strong protection as LDP under LDP’s threat model.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed Condensed Local Differential Privacy
(CLDP) for utility-aware and privacy-preserving data collection,
and developed three protocols: Ordinal-CLDP, Item-CLDP, and
Sequence-CLDP. Our protocols have the desirable property of
remaining accurate for populations that are orders of magnitude
smaller than those required by existing LDP protocols to give
adequate accuracy. Furthermore, our protocols handle a variety of
data types prevalent in the cybersecurity domain, including item
sequences. Our Symantec case studies and experiments on public
datasets show that proposed CLDP protocols offer significant
accuracy improvement over existing LDP protocols.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Recall that for item universe U , Exponential Mechanism (EM),
denoted by ΦEM , takes as input true value v and produces fake
value y ∈ U with probability:
Pr[ΦEM (v) = y] =
e
−α·d(v,y)
2∑
z∈U e
−α·d(v,z)
2
We prove here that ΦEM satisfies α-CLDP by showing that:
Pr[ΦEM (v1) = y]
Pr[ΦEM (v2) = y]
≤ eα·d(v1,v2)
Proof. We start by applying the definition of EM and breaking the
odds ratio into two terms:
Pr[ΦEM (v1) = y]
Pr[ΦEM (v2) = y]
=
e
−α·d(v1,y)
2∑
z∈U e
−α·d(v1,z)
2
e
−α·d(v2,y)
2∑
z∈U e
−α·d(v2,z)
2
(5)
=
e
−α·d(v1,y)
2
e
−α·d(v2,y)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
*
·
∑
z∈U e
−α·d(v2,z)
2∑
z∈U e
−α·d(v1,z)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
**
(6)
For *, we observe that:
e
−α·d(v1,y)
2
e
−α·d(v2,y)
2
= e
α·
(
d(v2,y)−d(v1,y)
)
2 (7)
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Since d is a metric, it satisfies the triangle inequality. Therefore, it
holds that: d(v2, y)− d(v1, y) ≤ d(v1, v2). Combining this with
the above, we conclude for *:
e
−α·d(v1,y)
2
e
−α·d(v2,y)
2
≤ eα·d(v1,v2)2 (8)
Next, we study the second term **:∑
z∈U e
−α·d(v2,z)
2∑
z∈U e
−α·d(v1,z)
2
=
∑
z∈U e
−α·d(v2,z)+α·d(v1,z)−α·d(v1,z)
2∑
z∈U e
−α·d(v1,z)
2
(9)
Again by triangle inequality: d(v1, z) − d(v2, z) ≤ d(v1, v2).
Applying this to the numerator we get:∑
z∈U e
−α·d(v2,z)
2∑
z∈U e
−α·d(v1,z)
2
≤
∑
z∈U e
α·d(v1,v2)−α·d(v1,z)
2∑
z∈U e
−α·d(v1,z)
2
(10)
≤ e
α·d(v1,v2)
2 ·∑z∈U e−α·d(v1,z)2∑
z∈U e
−α·d(v1,z)
2
(11)
≤ eα·d(v1,v2)2 (12)
We established that ∗ ≤ eα·d(v1,v2)2 and ∗∗ ≤ eα·d(v1,v2)2 .
Plugging them into Equation 6 concludes our proof:
Pr[ΦEM (v1) = y]
Pr[ΦEM (v2) = y]
≤ eα·d(v1,v2)2 · eα·d(v1,v2)2 = eα·d(v1,v2)
APPENDIX B
SEQUENCE-CLDP PRIVACY PROOFS
This section contains the privacy proofs for the Sequence-CLDP
perturbation mechanism given in Algorithm 2 of the main text. We
have claimed in the main text that Sequence-CLDP satisfies two
properties: length indistinguishability and content indistinguisha-
bility. We organize this section into two subsections for proving
each property.
B.1 Length Indistinguishability
We first prove that Sequence-CLDP, denoted here onwards by
ΦSEQ, satisfies α-length-indistinguishability when certain value
ranges are enforced for its parameters halt, gen. We need to show
that for any pair of true sequences X , Y :
Pr[ΦSEQ(X) `]
Pr[ΦSEQ(Y ) `]
≤ eα·abs(|X|−|Y |)
Proof. Observe from Algorithm 2 in the main text that given a true
sequence X of length |X|, ΦSEQ produces an output sequence of
length ` with probability:
Pr[ΦSEQ(X) `] =

halt · (1− halt)`
when ` < |X|
(1− halt)|X| · (1− gen) · gen`−|X|
when ` ≥ |X|
We consider several disjoint cases depending on the length of true
sequences X , Y . The parameters must be chosen so that all cases
are simultaneously satisfied.
Case 0: |X| = |Y |. This case is trivial since ΦSEQ treats their
length equally, resulting in:
Pr[ΦSEQ(X) `]
Pr[ΦSEQ(Y ) `]
= 1 = eα·0 if |X| = |Y |
Remaining cases fall under |X| 6= |Y |, and are analyzed case-by-
case below.
Case 1: ` < |X| and ` < |Y |
Pr[ΦSEQ(X) `]
Pr[ΦSEQ(Y ) `]
=
halt · (1− halt)`
halt · (1− halt)` = 1 ≤ e
α·abs(|X|−|Y |)
Since abs(|X| − |Y |) ≥ 0, we trivially have eα·abs(|X|−|Y |) ≥
1, hence this case is satisfied without placing constraints on the
values of halt, gen.
Case 2: ` ≥ |X| and ` ≥ |Y |
Pr[ΦSEQ(X) `]
Pr[ΦSEQ(Y ) `]
=
(1− halt)|X| · (1− gen) · gen`−|X|
(1− halt)|Y | · (1− gen) · gen`−|Y |
= (1− halt)|X|−|Y | · gen|Y |−|X|
Divide this into two subcases:
2a: |X| < |Y |: When this holds, the requirement that
(1− halt)|X|−|Y | · gen|Y |−|X| ≤ eα·abs(|X|−|Y |)
can be written as:
gen|Y |−|X|
(1− halt)|Y |−|X| ≤ e
α·(|Y |−|X|)
(
gen
1− halt )
|Y |−|X| ≤ eα·(|Y |−|X|)
Thus, we have the constraints for parameters halt, gen as:
gen
1− halt ≤ e
α (13)
2b: |X| > |Y |: When this holds, the same requirement can be
written as:
(1− halt)|X|−|Y |
gen|X|−|Y |
≤ eα·(|X|−|Y |)
(
1− halt
gen
)|X|−|Y | ≤ eα·(|X|−|Y |)
resulting in the parameter constraints:
1− halt
gen
≤ eα (14)
Case 3: ` < |X| and ` ≥ |Y |
Pr[ΦSEQ(X) `]
Pr[ΦSEQ(Y ) `]
≤ eα·abs(|X|−|Y |)
halt · (1− halt)`
(1− halt)|Y | · (1− gen) · gen`−|Y | ≤ e
α·abs(|X|−|Y |)
halt
1− gen · (
1− halt
gen
)`−|Y | ≤ eα·abs(|X|−|Y |)
Since the assumption in this case is |Y | ≤ ` < |X|, we can
rewrite the RHS as:
halt
1− gen · (
1− halt
gen
)`−|Y | ≤ eα·(`−|Y |) · eα·(|X|−`)
Given the constraint we established in Equation 14 holds, the
following is a sufficient condition to satisfy the above:
halt
1− gen ≤ e
α·(|X|−`)
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Notice that, by assumption, |X| > ` and both |X| and ` are
integers representing sequence length. Then, |X|−` ≥ 1, making
the following parameter constraint sufficient:
halt
1− gen ≤ e
α (15)
Case 4: ` ≥ |X| and ` < |Y |
Pr[ΦSEQ(X) `]
Pr[ΦSEQ(Y ) `]
≤ eα·abs(|X|−|Y |)
(1− halt)|X| · (1− gen) · gen`−|X|
halt · (1− halt)` ≤ e
α·abs(|X|−|Y |)
1− gen
halt
· ( gen
1− halt )
`−|X| ≤ eα·abs(|X|−|Y |)
Since the assumption in this case is |X| ≤ ` < |Y |, we can
rewrite the RHS as:
1− gen
halt
· ( gen
1− halt )
`−|X| ≤ eα·(|Y |−`) · eα·(`−|X|)
Given the constraint we established in Equation 13 holds, the
following is a sufficient condition to satisfy the above:
1− gen
halt
≤ eα·(|Y |−`)
Since |Y | > ` and both |Y | and ` are integers, we have |Y |− ` ≥
1, making the following parameter constraint sufficient:
1− gen
halt
≤ eα (16)
Combine all cases: Finally, we combine the parameter constraints
we identified at the end of each case (Equations 13, 14, 15, and
16) to obtain a system of equations:
gen
1− halt ≤ e
α 1− halt
gen
≤ eα
halt
1− gen ≤ e
α 1− gen
halt
≤ eα
Given the privacy parameter α, the values of halt, gen sat-
isfying all four equations simultaneously satisfy α-length-
indistinguishability. If we set halt=gen and solve this system of
equations, we observe that the following is a solution (which we
call the symmetric solution in the main text):
halt = gen =
1
eα + 1
Another solution to the same system of equations, which we call
the asymmetric solution, is desirable when input sequences X , Y
are longer and therefore a smaller halting probability is preferable:
0 < halt <
1
eα + 1
and 1− eα · halt ≤ gen ≤ 1− halt
eα
B.2 Content Indistinguishability
Next, we prove that for the above choice of parameters, ΦSEQ
satisfies α-content-indistinguishability. That is, for any pair of true
sequences X , Y of same length, the following holds:
Pr[ΦSEQ(X) = S]
Pr[ΦSEQ(Y ) = S]
≤ eα·dseq(X,Y )
Proof. We divide into 3 possible cases depending on how |S|
relates to |X| = |Y |.
Case 1: |S| = |X| = |Y |. In this case, Algorithm 2 must have
behaved as follows. Upon reaching its main loop (lines 5-14), it
must have run lines 6-9 for i = 1 to max len and, in each iteration,
the event with probability (1− halt) must have occurred such that
X[i] was perturbed and the perturbed item was appended to S.
The perturbation is performed by the function call to Algorithm 1,
which we denote by ΦEM . Then, in iteration i = max len + 1,
the event with probability (1 − gen) must have occurred so that
a sequence S with length exactly equal to |X| = |Y | = n was
returned. The odds-ratio probabilities of the overall run can be
computed as:
Pr[ΦSEQ(X) = S]
Pr[ΦSEQ(Y ) = S]
?
≤ eα·dseq(X,Y )
(1− gen) ·∏ni=1(1− halt) · Pr[ΦEM (X[i]) = S[i]]
(1− gen) ·∏ni=1(1− halt) · Pr[ΦEM (Y [i]) = S[i]]
?
≤ eα·dseq(X,Y )∏n
i=1 Pr[ΦEM (X[i]) = S[i]]∏n
i=1 Pr[ΦEM (Y [i]) = S[i]]
?
≤ eα·dseq(X,Y )
By Theorem 1, for any index i:
Pr[ΦEM (X[i]) = S[i]]
Pr[ΦEM (Y [i]) = S[i]]
≤ eα·d(X[i],Y [i]) (17)
Applying Equation 17, we obtain:
n∏
i=1
eα·d(X[i],Y [i])
?≤ eα·dseq(X,Y )
eα·
∑n
i=1 d(X[i],Y [i]) ≤ eα·dseq(X,Y )
which holds by definition of dseq, completing the proof for Case
1.
Case 2: |S| < |X| = |Y |. In this case, Algorithm 2 must have
run lines 6-9 for |S| + 1 iterations; in the first |S| iterations, the
event with probability (1 − halt) must have occurred to build the
perturbed sequence S, and in the last iteration the halting event
must have occurred so that the sequence of length |S| = m was
returned without adding more elements. The odds-ratio becomes:
Pr[ΦSEQ(X) = S]
Pr[ΦSEQ(Y ) = S]
?≤ eα·dseq(X,Y )
halt ·∏mi=1(1− halt) · Pr[ΦEM (X[i]) = S[i]]
halt ·∏mi=1(1− halt) · Pr[ΦEM (Y [i]) = S[i]]
?≤ eα·dseq(X,Y )∏m
i=1 Pr[ΦEM (X[i]) = S[i]]∏m
i=1 Pr[ΦEM (Y [i]) = S[i]]
?≤ eα·dseq(X,Y )
Notice that this case is different than Case 1 in the bounds of the
product—the product goes from i = 1 to length of |S|, which is
shorter than |X|. Applying Equation 17:
eα·
∑m
i=1 d(X[i],Y [i])
?≤ eα·dseq(X,Y )
A distance metric d satisfies the non-negativity property by defi-
nition. Therefore, for m < n = |X|, we have:
m∑
i=1
d(X[i], Y [i]) ≤
n∑
i=1
d(X[i], Y [i]) = dseq(X,Y )
completing the proof for Case 2.
Case 3: |S| > |X| = |Y |. In this case, Algorithm 2 must have
run lines 6-9 for |X| iterations, and in each iteration the event
with probability (1 − halt) must have occurred. Then, for |S| −
|X| iterations, lines 10-13 must have run, and the item generation
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event with probability gen must have occurred in these iterations.
Finally, to return S, a final iteration must have occurred with the
stopping event having (1 − gen) probability. Let m = |S| and
n = |X|. The odds-ratio is:
Pr[ΦSEQ(X) = S]
Pr[ΦSEQ(Y ) = S]
?≤ eα·dseq(X,Y )
(1− gen) ·∏m−ni=1 gen · Pr[random = S[i]]
·∏ni=1(1− halt) · Pr[ΦEM (X[i]) = S[i]]
(1− gen) ·∏m−ni=1 gen · Pr[random = S[i]]
·∏ni=1(1− halt) · Pr[ΦEM (Y [i]) = S[i]]
?≤ eα·dseq(X,Y )
where Pr[random = S[i]] denotes the probability that the random
sampling on line 11 of Algorithm 2 returns item S[i]. Note that
the random sampling does not depend on the properties of inputs
X , Y , therefore we can safely cancel most terms. We end up with:∏n
i=1 Pr[ΦEM (X[i]) = S[i]]∏n
i=1 Pr[ΦEM (Y [i]) = S[i]]
?≤ eα·dseq(X,Y )
Applying Equation 17 and continuing in the same fashion as Case
1, it is straightforward to complete the proof.
